Captain Howard W. Brown - 2nd Signal Service Company attached to No. 1 Wireless Unit RAAF

CAPTAIN HOWARD W. BROWN
FIRST OPERATING PLATOON, 126TH SRIC
WORKED WITH 1 WIRELESS UNIT RAAF
IN TOWNSVILLE, QLD
IN AUSTRALIA DURING WWII

On 8 December 1941, Lieutenant Howard W. Brown, a radio intelligence veteran was attached to the Second Signal Service Company in Manila in the Philippines. The bombing of the Philippines on that day changed the mission of his Army Intercept unit from monitoring Japanese diplomatic traffic to more important Japanese Air Force communications. They began to reconstruct the Japanese tactical military networks being used by the Japanese military in the Philippines area. This was the beginning of US Army radio traffic analysis in WWII.

Lt. Brown had originally been a Corporal in the Tenth Signal Service Company assigned to the Radio and Telegraph Office at Fort Santiago, Manila in the early 1930s. Here Brown became familiar with the Japanese Kana code via his connection with an adjoining Signal Corps Intercept Station. In September 1933, Cpl Brown attended an advanced Signal School at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey where he helped to design a course covering the interception of Japanese Kana code. He was supposed to be sent to Tientsin, China in December 1934 to start communications intercept activity. His unit was instead assigned to the Intercept Station at Fort McKinley, Rizal Province, in the Philippines.

Brown left the US Army in 1936 and worked at MacKay Radio, a commercial radio station in Manila. Major Joe Sheer, the Officer-In-Charge of the US Army Intercept Station in Manila convinced Howard W. Brown to apply for a commission with the Army. 2nd Lieutenant Howard W. Brown was the Operations Officer in the Second Signal Service Company when the Japanese attacked the Philippines.

The first military communications that Lt. Brown and his men intercepted on the 8 December 1941, was a Japanese air-to-ground net which was passing Direction Finding bearings to the Japanese bombers on their route to Manila. The Intercept Station was evacuated to Corregidor on Christmas Eve 1941 with the rest of General Douglas MacArthur's staff. The men were reassigned to the Signal Section as communicators during this emergency period, putting a stop to all radio intelligence activities.

Brown however was able to convince his superiors to reopen an Intercept Station co-located with the 60th Coast Artillery Anti-Aircraft (AAA) Command Post inside the Malinta Tunnel on Corregidor. This makeshift Intercept Station monitored Japanese air reconnaissances nets from 8 January 1942 until mid February 1942. Using Sigint reports from Brown's Intercept Station, the air defence unit was able to shoot down six Japanese reconnaissance aircraft. The Intercept Station would give the AA guns the predicted time and direction of arrival, thus allowing the guns to be armed and loaded in readiness for the arrival of "Foto Joe", the Japanese reconnaissance aircraft.

Traffic Analysis of this Japanese air-to-ground net revealed a control station at Sama on Hainan Island and one outstation in Indo-China, another near Hong Kong and 12 other unlocated outstations. By mid February 1942, the US Army Intercept Station comprised 5 officers, 6 enlisted men using 4 HF radio receivers. Their main two priorities were:-

Lt. Brown and his Unit was able to provide G-2 with information about Japanese forces movements "by inference from traffic analysis, information as to where the Japanese might next be expected to move".

On the evening of 11 March 1942, General MacArthur and his family and senior staff boarded four PT boats and were evacuated to Del Monte on Mindanao. They later flew to Batchelor Airfield south of Darwin in the Northern Territory, Australia in B-17 Flying Fortresses. Between 27 and 31 March 1942, the 11 men of the radio intelligence unit were evacuated to Del Monte plantation on Mindanao where they established a new Intercept Station.

General Wainwright in the Philippines received instructions from General Douglas MacArthur on 24 March 1942 to send Lieutenant Brown and his ten Enlisted Men, formerly of the Second Signal Service Company to Australia. Orders were issued as follows:-

They flew to Cebu initially and then to Del Monte Airfield on Mindanao. They expected to be immediately flown to Australia as a matter of urgency. Despite the weight that their orders carried, there were a lot of high ranking officers, including pilots, who were also supposed to travel to Australia. The competition for aircraft seats was tough. No aircraft arrived until 13 April 1942, when three B-17 Flying Fortresses and ten B-25 Mitchells arrived from Australia. These were the aircraft of the Royce Mission, under Major General Ralph Royce, which carried out a daring series of raids behind enemy lines. These aircraft brought cigarettes, candy and medical supplies for the men on Bataan.

A few days later one of the two remaining B-17s (one had already been destroyed on the ground) was the first of the remaining 12 aircraft to return to Australia. 1st Lt. Howard W. Brown managed to get a seat on this B-17E Flying Fortress #41-2486 piloted by Captain Edward C. Teats on 14 April 1942. Messer was placed in charge of the remaining men at Del Monte.

Four seats were also allocated to the men on four B-25 Mitchell due to leave later that night as follows:-

They flew due east from Del Monte and then headed south, giving Mindanao a wide berth.

Brown's flight was going well until one engine on the B-17E Flying Fortress started pumping oil and had to be shut down. They were about 45 minutes out from their destination, with 19 personnel on board the B-17 Flying Fortress and two full bomb-bay tanks. With the Japanese now at Del Monte there was no question of them turning back. They pumped fuel into the wing tanks as quickly as possible, and they soon had the B-17 trimmed fairly well. Then another engine started throwing oil. They reduced power on this second engine and the other two engines were given more power. They eventually limped into Darwin. The body count on board the B-17 was:-

Meanwhile, the rest of Lt Brown's men who had been left on Mindanao, were not so fortunate. When the next aircraft came on about 22 April 1942, the USAAF Colonel in command at Del Monte told the remaining men that a new list of passengers had arrived from Australia and that they were not on the list. Another aircraft arrived a week later and they were given the same news. When that aircraft left on 29 April 1942, it ended up being the last aircraft to leave Del Monte.

Early on 30 April 1942, urgent radio orders signed by General Douglas MacArthur arrived from Australia via Corregidor, saying that they were to proceed to Lake Lanao where six seats would be available on a PBY Catalina. Lake Lanao was a day's travel by truck. They left by truck and after some mechanical issues they arrived at Lake Lanao on the evening of 30 April 1942. There were two PBYs anchored off an island in the lake. They approached the despatcher who informed them that they would not be going. One of the two PBYs that took off was forced down due to overloading and sprung a leak. The four Intercept Operators and the personnel off the downed PBY returned to Del Monte by bus.

Lt Brown and his 4 men who had arrived in Australia on 14 April 1942 stayed at Batchelor Airfield overnight and took off at daylight on 15 April 1942 for Brisbane in south east Queensland in a C-47 Dakota. They landed at Archerfield Airfield on the southern outskirst of Brisbane at about 1900 hours. They jumped in a command car and head for Lennons Hotel in George Street in the city. All that Lt Brown had with him was two very dirty cotton uniforms, a pistol in his belt, a brief case full of secret papers, and about one inch of beard growth!

Lt Brown had his first Scotch and soda in months, then another and another! He then had dinner and that was so good he had another! He then went for a walk around the city. He bought a heap of fruit from a fruit stand. Almost everything except a pineapple which would have reminded him too much of his time in Del Monte. He went back to Lennons Hotel and cleaned weeks of dirt and grime off his body.

The next morning he reported to Headquarters, Base Section Three, at Somerville Girls School at South Brisbane for onward transportation to Melbourne. he went in to pay his respects to the Base Commander. Brown was stopped by the Executive Officer, Lt Col Lilburn D. Fator, who as a Captain had been Lt Brown's Signal Officer at Nichols Field.

Lt. Brown then flew down to Melbourne and reported to Headquarters on 18 April 1942 where he met up with Colonel Sherr. They both went in and met with General Sutherland, who was General Douglas MacArthur's Chief of Staff. Sutherland told Brown that he was heading to north east Australia as the "Japanese were cooking up something around New Guinea and the Coral Sea". Sutherland wanted Brown to find out what the "Japanese were cooking up."

Messer, Card, Nurss, Phelan and Yamagata had reached Melbourne on 17 April 1942 and were standing by to head north with Lt. Brown. Colonel Sherr and Lt Brown attended a business meeting that afternoon and it was agreed that Lt. Brown and his men would join xxxxxx which was then being organised and that Lt. Brown should command that unit. On the morning of 20 April 1942, Lt Brown along with Sgt Card, Sgt Phelan and Cpl Nurss along with 8 National HRO receivers boarded an aircraft and took off on a foggy morning and head for Brisbane.

They flew blind for almost six hours and descended through a hole in the clouds into Brisbane. They proceed over to the lunch counter for a sandwich. They went back to the aircraft expecting to takeoff immediately. The pilot and crew had gone but left a message to be at the airfield the next morning at 0500 hours. Their orders had been for them to travel to Townsville that same day. Lt Brown rang Col Sherr in Melbourne who rang Squadron Leader Gatty, the Air Transport Commander ,who then tracked down the pilot. By then it was too late to take off so they stayed the night in Brisbane.

Lt Brown met the pilot that night in the bar at Lennons Hotel. He asked the pilot why they did not fly to Townsville that day. He replied "Oh, I had a date here and decided to stay overnight." Lt Brown asked him later that night what had happened to his date. He said "Aw, she stood me up."

They took off at daylight the next morning and flew into another pea souper. After six hours, the pilot decided they must be getting closer to Townsville, so he asked Townsville for a radio bearing. They received a bearing which put them north of Townsville, but the pilot thought that could not be correct as they had not been flying long enough. They flew for another hour and a half, and found a hole in the clouds. They descended down and located a railway line. They travelled along the railway line and circled a few of the stations trying to work out where they were. Unfortunately for them, as part of Air Raid Precautions, the Australian authorities had removed the name boards from all railway stations.

They gained altitude again and flew north for another hour and came across a break in the clouds which revealed an airfield. They landed with only 30 minutes of fuel on board and the RAAF ground crew told them they were at Cooktown, around 350 miles north of Townsville! They refuelled and had a meal of RAAF bulley-beef, beans and biscuits and took off again and headed south. At about 200 feet altitude the starboard engine started popping like a fifty calibre machine gun. The pilot tried to rectify things but when the co-pilot pointed out they were only about 50 feet off the water, they circled the hill and turned back to Cooktown Airfield. With the airfield coming up fast, their wheels just clipped the end of the runway.

They unloaded the aircraft, and the pilot advised they would not be flying again that day. The pilot said "We will take the sump off the motor and if we find any steel chips in it, we will have to wait here for a new motor." They all piled into a truck and headed into Cooktown. They booked in to the only hotel and had cots on the porch. Yamagata went fishing in the nearby river. Luckily the boat had arrived from the south that week with the beer supply.

Wing Commander Henry Roy Booth (261929) RAAF, wired RAAF Headquarters and advising them of the groups adventure and requested them to send up another aircraft to bring them down to Townsville. RAAF HQs advised that another aircraft had been sent from Brisbane and would be in Cooktown at about noon the following day. Lt Brown and his men went to Cooktown Airfield the next day but no aircraft arrived.

In the meantime, the pilot of the troubled aircraft said they had had not found any steel chips in the sump but had found two fouled plugs. He advised that the engines were running alright and he could fly them down to Townsville. They boarded the aircraft and eventually reached Townsville. When they reached Townsville they asked the Signals Officer what had happened to the aircraft they were sending up to Cooktown for them. He said "There its is, that Lockheed out on the field. The pilot had a date here in Townsville and decided to stay overnight!"

The next morning, which I believe was 23 April 1942, they started work in Townsville. Wing Commander Booth RAAF, played politics with RAAF North East Area Command, Blakeley stirred up His Majesty's Postmaster General's telephone service and has some telephone lines installed, Grogan got them four empty residential houses in French and Sycamore Streets, Pimlico, Lt Brown played politics with the American Army and obtained most of everything that he needed from the Signal Depot before they discovered that Brown was not authorised to receive these items. Nurss and Yamagata did the cooking and they all pitched in to build and operate the station at Pimlico.

On the first afternoon of operation, they picked up a Japanese Navy Air-Ground Net with aircraft in the air. They identified it by the procedure they were using which was the same as the Navy stations working in the Hainan Army Net had used.

They established the location of the Net Control at Rabaul, with stations on Bougainville and at Tulagi. There were frequently as many as 40 flights of one to fifty-four aircraft in the air during the period of a day.

From that one Net they were able to branch out and reconstruct the entire Japanese Air Force Order of Battle in the Southern Areas. Attempts to furnish Port Moresby with Warning Information failed badly because of the slow communications and the necessity for strict security regulations.

One moonlit night in July, a Japanese Emily Flying Boat snuck over Townsville and dropped a string of bombs near the harbour. They caught the authorities off guard on that first night, but everyone was prepared on the second night. The American and Australian team at French Street used every available receiver and operator on search, and after about an hour they found an enemy aircraft. The Bearings from the D/F Station at Townsville placed him on a line with Gasmata, headed straight for Townsville. They had a total of three bombings raid on Townsville and they were able to give six to seven hours advance warning on all except for the first raid.

The P-39 Airacobras caught the Japanese Emily Flying Boat on the 3rd and last bombing raid on Townsville. The Japanese crew reported back to its base in the clear:- "The Emperor's Ship has been attacked from both broadsides and damaged."

Captain Brown is shown in handwritten Intelligence Reports contacting 3 Fighter Sector Headquarters (3FSHQ) RAAF leading up to the 2nd and 3rd Japanese bombing raids on Townsville.

Extracts from the 2nd raid 27 July 1942:-

Brown's quarters were in the house at 25 French Street, Pimlico, just around the corner from where I later lived in Haig Street, Pimlico. He was a bit "gung ho" with his service pistol. He used to shoot at the pigeons sitting on the low voltage electricity wires through his window at 25 French Street. He was also reported to have shot out his light in his room one night in lieu of turning it off. There was a suggested that he may have had a bit too much to drink that night! After his personal staff vehicle was stolen, he organised a group of off-duty servicemen to locate it. It was soon found abandoned. Brown then ordered the men to do a stakeout in French Street to attempt to catch the thieves in case they returned. They did not return.

In early May 1942, General Sutherland visited Townsville and Lt Brown asked him what was being done towards getting the remainder of the Second Signal personnel out of Mindanao. Sutherland said that he was sending up a B-24 Liberator to pick them up and that it was leaving Darwin the following morning. Apparently the B-24 left Darwin, flew to Mindanao and brought back Lt Col Elsmore and his staff instead of the Second Signal personnel. Lt Brown stated that this resulted in the loss of six of the most valuable and urgently needed men in the Radio Intelligence Service.

With the surrender of the garrison at Mindanao these men, with the exception of Bradbury, took to the hills. Bradbury had very bad feet and could only walk with assistance. He decided to stay and surrender rather than hold up the other men. He had not been heard of since the surrender. The rest of the men joined a guerilla band. Maslak, Stein and Kapp left Mindanao in a native sailboat and set sail for Australia in July 1942 and have never been heard from since. Rhen was shot in the back and killed by another American member of the guerilla group, as the result of an argument. Gill joined Colonel Fertig's guerilla group in East Central Mindanao, operated coast watch stations and was commissioned as a "Mexican" Second Lieutenant. He was evacuated to Australia by submarine in March 1943 and returned to the USA shortly thereafter.

An Operational History of the 126th Signal Radio Intelligence Company (126th SRIC) states that the First Operating Platoon of the 126th SRIC left Camp Pell in Melbourne on 19 May 1942 and proceed to Mount Macedon, in Victoria their anticipated permanent camp. They established themselves at Mount Macedon with one Direction Finder on top of Mount Macedon about 3/4 mile from their camp.

On 10 July 1942, the First Operating Platoon, 126th SRIC under 1st Lieutenant Walter R. Menear, moved by motor convoy to Townsville, arriving there on 2 August 1942 in a convoy of about twenty trucks. 1st Lt Menear had begged, borrowed and stolen to obtain these trucks. Two of the trucks rolled in Townsville using shoe leather for bearings. The Quartermaster repair shops in Brisbane had forgotten to groove the shims for oil.

Lt Brown, GHQ Radio Intelligence Officer, assigned two GHQ officers, Lt. Phelan and W/O Card to establish a Japanese Code School for the instruction of the platoon's Intercept Operators. In addition the platoon was assigned the mission of monitoring Allied Air Reconnaissance frequencies, copying Allied clear and coded messages during the attacks on Guadalcanal and reporting by Teletype to GHQ. The platoon's 206-C Direction Finders were setup to work with No. 1 Wireless Unit RAAF. The Direction Finders were located at Townsville, Cairns, Charters Towers and Cloncurry. Their mission was to work with 1 Wireless Unit to secure bearings on enemy aircraft by setting up a joint US Army/RAAF interception unit in French Street.

Special Order 185?, Headquarters United States Army Forces in Australia APO 501 dated 18 July 1942 shows the following "named EM, 2nd Sig Serv ??, now on duty at stations indicated, are trfd to 837th Sig Serv Det Melbourne, Vic, and are atchd to HQ Det, this HQ, for administration only and will remain on their present duties at their present stations":-

In August 2024, John Looby contacted me and told me that his grandparents lived at 20 French Street. John was told that their daughter, Margaret Looby (his aunty,) was courted over the back fence by an American Serviceman Richard Nurss who was in 22 French Street and they later married. John realised that 22 French Street was not one of the houses involved with 1 Wireless Unit, so he wondered if Richard Nurss had been in 21 Sycamore Street instead. So Lt. Brown, Sgt. Card, Sgt. Phelan and Corp. Nurss were the four US Army personnel based at French Street, Pimlico.

In September 1942, Japanese submarines were detected operating inshore along the Gulf of Carpentaria and there was a scare that the Japanese might make a landing there. The 126th SRIC sent a Direction Finding team with an SCR-206 out to Cloncurry to help back up the D/F unit already there in case trouble occurred. The extra D/F team returned to Townsville in October 1942.

On 15 September 1942, Brown flew up to Port Moresby for a conference with General Akin. The Japanese were within 35 miles of Port Moresby. Brown returned to Townsville organised the issue of the necessary Orders to move a Detachment of one officer and six men on the understanding that General Akin had already made the necessary arrangements. However this had not occurred.

Wing Commander Booth came into Townsville unexpectedly that afternoon and revoked the Orders after he found out about them. He told Brown that it had "cut clean across predetermined policy." Brown Brown told Booth that war was not a predetermined policy, and explained the circumstances under which the orders had been requested. Brown told Booth that they would lose the "goddam war" if they did not get some men up to Port Moresby soon. Booth did not agree, so Brown sent a message to General Akin who ironed out the matter with xxxxx and the team were on their way to Port Moresby after about a week's delay.

By the time the team had arrived in Port Moresby and started to operate, the Buna Campaign was under way. The Japanese were cornered in the Kokoda Pass, and they were thrown into a defensive posture in other locations. The threat to Port Moresby had been lifted.

In October 1942, Brown was called to Brisbane for a conference, where it was decided that the 126th SRIC and other American personnel should build and operate an intercept station in Brisbane to intercept Japanese mainline traffic in volume for Central Bureau at 21 Henry Street, Ascot, Brisbane.

Captain Brown and the First Operating Platoon of the 126th SRIC left Townsville under Movement Order No. 126, HQ USASOS, on 15 November 1942 by rail for Brisbane, arriving there on 18 November 1942 where they setup a new operational site at Northgate on the north side of Brisbane. Australian workmen erected a radio shack and an antenna array using 6 rhombic antennas was erected. They began intercepting Japanese Army and Diplomatic radio traffic on 20 November 1942. All their intercepts were forwarded to the nearby Central Bureau at 21 Henry Street, Ascot. Captain Brown, Lt. Phelan and W/O Card started training more men as intercept operators. No direction finding work happened during this period of training. On 26 November 1942, it started to rain heavily and the site was flooded.

In April 1943, the First Operating Platoon joined up with the rest of the 126th SRIC after they had disembarked their ship in Brisbane on 23 March 1943. They marched to Camp Doomben where GHQ Officer Captain Howard M. Brown and 1st Lt. Menear, CO of the First Operating Platoon, visited them three days later. Radio intelligence began to expand.

In June 1943, and Intercept and Direction Finding Detachment of 15 men, equipped with five BC-342 receivers and one SCR-255 Direction Finder was shipped to Adelaide River near Mount Bundy Station about 70 miles south of Darwin in the Northern Territory.

Also in June 1943, the 126th SRIC sent a Detachment of 15 men equipped with three SCR-206 Direction Finders to Port Moresby. When General Akin need a Direction Finding Net to help root out Japanese spotting stations at Dobodura, the Detachment was flown across the Gap. The Detachment pinpointed the Japanese spotters and the Infantry chased them out.

In July 1943, a Detachment similar to the Adelaide river Detachment was sent to Merauke in Dutch New Guinea. Due to horrible conditions for Direction Finding, the Detachment was relocated to Horn Island at the tip of Cape York after two months.

Shortly after they arrived in Townsville, Card, Nurss and Phelan were promoted. Phelan was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant, Card was made a Warrant Officer, and Nurss was made a Master Sergeant.

In May 1943, Card and Nurss were commissioned as Second Lieutenants, and Phelan was promoted to First Lieutenant.

In September 1943, they learnt that Colonel Sherr was killed in an aircraft accident in Calcutta.

In October 1943, the Adelaide River Detachment was increased by about 40 men. Brown was at Adelaide River, helping to build a new Station when General Akin recalled him to Brisbane. A short time later Brown was back in Washington D.C. on temporary duty with the USAAF representing the SWPA in the organisation of the Air Force Radio Squadron, Mobile.

Brown left San Francisco on 10 January 1944 and arrived back in Brisbane on 12 January 1944. He flew to Finschaven in March 1944, to relocate the Detachment which had recently moved up from Dobodura. Brown made a side visit to the Admiralty Island to select a Direction Finder site, however plans for this site were subsequently abandoned.

In early 1944, communications with the Philippines guerilla networks had deteriorated to an alarming extent. So many stations had been established in the Philippines but the required terminal facilities in Australia had been neglected. General Sutherland directed the Chief Signal Officer to take over and operate the terminal facilities. General Akin assigned this role to Brown, who first flew to Darwin for an inspection. He found that only half the equipment needed to do the job was available and there was only one competent operator.

Brown ordered more radio equipment and had it flown to Darwin and installed as soon as possible. He ordered code training equipment and two instructors. He had communications restored to a normal operating status within thirty days.

Brown flew to Hollandia in early September 1944 and built another station, to work with the guerillas. At 2330 hours on 17 September 1944, operations were switched from Darwin to Hollandia. The changeover was so seamless that the sending stations in the Philippines were not aware of the changeover. Lt Card took a Detachment from Hollandia in on the Leyte landings and made contact with the guerillas for General Douglas MacArthur.

They also established a station for guerilla contact for GHQ in Manila, however the Sixth and Eighth Armies soon took over and ran them out of business.

In November 1944, Brown assume command of the Forward Echelons of Central Bureau and the Signal Intelligence Service at Hollandia. He held that position until early February 1945. He then relocated to Luzon and rejoined General Akin's staff where he again devoted his time to radio intelligence.

In mid May 1945 he applied for his rotation back to the USA. It was approved and he left Manila on 19 May 1945 and arrived in Washington D.C. on 22 May 1945. On 26 July 1945, while he was writing his Reminisces he was under Orders to report to the Replacement Pool at Fort Monmouth. He expected to revert to inactive status within a few days and return to his job at Mackay Radio. He expected to stay in New York for several months and then go out to the Orient.

Reminisces of Lieutenant Colonel Howard W. Brown - SRH-045, Signal Security Agency, Washington D.C. of 4 August 1945

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